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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1 Did the initial slop of thp defendant violate his Fourth 
Amendment Protect IIHI .nini1.! u in reasonable search and seizure? 
2. Did the frisk of defendant' s peson constitute an unreasonable 
search? 
-i 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Oi i E eb ri iar] > 2 8 1 9 8 6 at appr ::»x i ma • 
Mike Beesley of the Salt Lake City Police Department, w m i e n 
general patrol in a marked patrol car, observed three in-iivi.i;,^^ :• 
- t i ("ifI !: • S t r e e t : 'f'hfi 
lat^. det - <.,ned t. .* Joseph Greg Trujillo 'nes;. *i . Harv*r-.,. , a. . 
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. i at a si ow g a t e , g] ar i c i i ig i i i t o t h e s t o r e fr< .il I'Hwirh- .;• I In 
proceeded. As the three individuals reached an adult movie theatre, 
located approximately 360 South State, they stopped and looked at 
the suggestive advertising posters (T-7). Officer Beesley pulled 
along side of the curb adjacent to the individuals and stopped his 
car. 
During his shift, which began at 11:00 p.m. on the evening 
of the 27th, Officer Beesley did not recall any reports of criminal 
activity in the vicinity of Fourth South and State Street (T-17). 
While watching the three individuals Officer Beesley did not observe 
any violations of pedestrian-traffic ordinances of Salt Lake City. 
Officer Beesley did not recall having had contact with any of the 
three individuals prior to that night (T-22). 
Officer Beesley made the decision to detain the three 
individuals based on observations of them from his patrol car. 
Those observations were as follows: Officer Beesley had observed 
the individuals glancing into a store front window as they walked 
slowly down the sidewalk, the three appeared nervous when they 
realized they were being observed by a police officer (T-24). After 
noticing the presence of the patrol car, Joseph Trujillo moved a 
small knapsack from his side to an area in front of him (T-9). 
Officer Beesley described that motion as alternatively, casual, or 
slow (T-21), hasty, or quick (T-22), and in between, casual and 
quick (T-22). Mr. Trujillo's bag was not visually concealed from 
Officer Beesley as a result of its movement (T-21). In addition to 
his observations, Officer Beesley decided to detain the three 
individuals based on his suspicions which were aroused by the early 
hour—3:30 a.m. (T-25) and his conclusion that the location was a 
high crime area. 
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Officer Beesley drove to the corner of Fourth South and 
State whereupon he existed his vehicle and approached the three 
individuals from the south. As Officer Beesley approached the three 
individuals, he observed Mr. Trujillo put the knapsack down near a 
garbage can at the corner of Fourth South and State (T. 9). Upon 
reaching the three individuals Officer Beesley asked them what they 
were doing in the area. They responded that they were going to 
Trujillo's cousin's place (T-ll). Subsequently, Officer Beesley 
asked them for identification. Only one of the three could produce 
an ID (T. 26). All three individuals, however, gave Officer Beesley 
their names. During this interrogation, Officer Beesley observed 
what he felt was a nervous reaction. Based upon that nervousness, 
Officer Beesley decided to perform a frisk search of Joseph Trujillo 
(T-30, T-12). 
Officer Beesley had not seen a weapon nor any portion of a 
weapon on the person of any of the individuals (T. 30). Rather, his 
decision to frisk was based on his "intuition" that someone might 
have a gun (T.30). During the frisk search of Joseph Trujillo, 
Officer Beesley located an object he later identified as a knife 
strapped to the midsection of Mr. Trujillo's chest (T.13). At that 
point, Mr. Trujillo was placed under arrest (T. 15). 
It was later determined that Joseph Greg Trujillo was a 
parolee from the Utah State Prison. Joseph Greg Trujillo had been 
granted parole on the 11th day of December, 1984, for the crime of 
burglary, a second degree felony. As a result of the incident of 
February 28, 1985, Trujillo's parole was revoked. 
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Defendant Trujillo filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the 
weapon because the officer had no reason to stop the defenant and 
could articulate no reasonable basis to justify the frisk. (R. 14, 
Addendum A). After a hearing the motion was denied. (R. 17/ 
Addendum B). The matter was submitted to the trial judge on the 
facts elucidated at the hearing on the motion to suppress. The 
Defendant was found guilty and sentenced to a term from Oto 5 years 
in carceration in the Utah State Prison. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellant first contents that the officer in this case 
had no basis to stop him and his companions. No report of criminal 
activity had been made and the officer had had no previous contact 
with the Appellant or his companions. The stop was made on the 
basis of a mere hunch which is impermissible. 
Further the Appellant alleges that the officer had no basis 
to conduct a pat down search. The officer could articulate no 
reasonable basis for such a search. The results of the search 
should have been suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INITIAL STOP OF DEFENDANT 
VIOLATED HIS FOURTH AMENDEMENT 
PROTECTION AGAINST UNREASONABLE 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE. 
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 
1868 (1965), the United States Supreme Court created a limited 
exception to the general probable cause requirement when it held 
that under appropriate circumstances a brief detention of a person, 
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absent probable cause to arrest, is permissible under the Fourth 
Amendment. See, also, Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 75 L.Ed 2d 
229 (1983). The Terry Court instructs that this limited exception 
is tailored to balance the government's interest in effective law 
enforcement against the individual's liberty, privacy and personal 
security. 
In justifying a particular detention, an officer must be 
able to point to specific articulable facts which, when viewed under 
an objective standard, create a reasonable suspicion that the 
defendant has committed or is about to commit a crime. Terry v. 
Ohio, supra; Florida v. Royer, supra. The Supreme Court in Terry 
appropriately cautioned that: 
Anything less would invite intrusions upon 
constitutionally guaranteed rights based on 
nothing more substantial than inarticulate 
hunches, a result this Court has consistently 
refused to sanction. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. 
The reasonable suspicion rationale of Terry has been codified in 
Utah law at Section 77-7-15 Utah Code Ann. (1953). 
In the case at bar, Officer Beesley's detention of the 
defendant, Joe Trujillo, constituted a seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment. B[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and 
restrains his freedom to walk away, he has seized that person." 
Terry at 16. In this case, the specific articulable facts relied on 
by the officer in his decision to detain the defendant lend little 
or no support to a finding of the required reasonable suspicion. 
Essentially, the officer's testimony revealed reliance on six 
factors to justify his detention of Mr. Trujillo. 
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1. The officer observed the defendant and two companions 
walking slowly along the sidewalk at 3:40 a.m. 
2. As they strolled, the three men looked into store-front 
windows 
hour. 
30 Trujillo and his companions were walking at an early 
4. The officer observed the three in a "high crime area". 
5. An alleged movement of a bag held by the defendant was 
interpreted by the officer as being suspecious or furtive. 
6. The defendant allegedly reacted nervously to the 
presence of the officer. 
When the enumerated factors are analyzed in light of case 
law from Utah, the United States Supreme Court, and other 
jurisdictions, it becomes readily apparent that the officer was not 
justified in detaining the defendant. 
Factor I. As noted above, the slow pace of the defendant 
was one factor which led the officer to detain Trujillo. However, a 
slow rate of progress was given little or no weight in establishing 
a reasonable suspicion by the Utah Supreme Court in the recent case 
of State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (1986). In that case, the officer 
based a stop on the fact that a car with out-of-state license plates 
was moving slowly through a residential area at 3:00 a.m. The Court 
held that the officer "had no objective facts on which to base a 
reasonable suspicion that the men were involved in criminal 
activity." Jjd. at 30. 
The specific circumstances surrounding this case do not 
augment any suspicion of criminal activity. The sidewalk was well 
illuminated by street and business lighting (T-6). None of the 
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officer's testimony gave any indication that Mr. Trujillo or his 
companions attempted to hide or conceal themselves. The officer did 
not observe any violations of pedestrian-traffic ordinances (T-21). 
If anything, a slow pace conveys an absence of apprehension or 
hurriedness which may usually be attributed criminal conduct. 
Many legitimate reasons exist for walking slowly such as: fatigue, 
health ailments, lethargy, or a mere desire to relax. The case law 
cited indicates nothing inherently suspicious about the fact that 
the Mr. Trujillo was proceeding slowly, and orderly, along the 
public sidewalk. Neither do the surrounding circumstances enhance a 
suspicion of criminal activity. Therefore, the officer may not rely 
on this factor to justify his detention of Trujillo. 
Factor II. Another factor relied on by the officer in his 
attempt to justify the detention of the Defendant was the fact that 
he observed the Defendant looking into store-front windows. 
Addressing this issue in Terry, supra, the United States Supreme 
Court recognized that "store windows . . . are made to be looked 
in." 392 U.S. at 901. The language of the opinion and the context 
within which it is found imply that viewing store windows is, 
without more, irrelevant to the formation of a reasonable 
suspicion. 
The Court in Terry did, in fact, conclude that other 
factors combined to justify detention. There, the defendants had 
displayed a long and repetitive pattern of behavior that was clearly 
suspicious. 
There is nothing unusual in two men standing 
together on a street corner, perhaps waiting for 
someone nor is there anything suspicious about 
people in such circumstances strolling up and 
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down the street singly or in pairs. Store 
windows, moreover are made to be looked in. The 
story is quite different where, as here, the two 
men hover about a street corner for an extended 
period of time, at the end of which it becomes 
apparent that they are not waiting for anyone or 
anything; where these men pace alternately along 
an identical route—pausing to stare in the same 
window roughly 24 times; where each completion of 
this route is followed immediately by a 
conference between the two men on the corner. 
Id. at 907. 
In contrast, the case at bar involves no such pattern of 
behavior. The officer testified that the defendant made continuous 
progress along the sidewalk and did not return to any store windows 
they had already passed (T-20). In fact, the officer testified he 
concluded that Trujillo and his companion were looking into store 
windows because they actually stopped in front of the adult theater 
(T.6). Mr. Trujillo's interest in "suggestive posters" (T-19) of an 
adult movie theatre, if anything, vitiates suspicion of burglary or 
other criminal activity. This conduct is consistent with casual 
activities of males of Mr. Trujillo's age group. In short, casually 
looking at adult movie posters and store windows while progressing 
down a sidewalk is not a specifically articulated fact which raises 
a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or is being committed. 
Factor III. The officer testified that his suspicion was 
also aroused by the hour at which the defendant was observed (3:40 
a.m.) (T-25). Usually the streets of Salt Lake City are nearly 
vacant at that time. However, like gait, time of day is generally 
of little or no importance in justifying a detention. Again, in 
Carpena the defendants were stopped at about 3:00 A.M. but the Utah 
Supreme Court refused to attach significance to the time of day. 
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In State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985), two 
individuals were detained while walking at the hour of 1:00 a.m. 
The State, in that case, confessed error stating that the detention 
was violative of the Fourth Amendment. Although the Court did not 
reach the merits of that case, it is apparent that the early hour 
factor was not relied on as an articulable fact supporting 
reasonable suspicion. 
Addressing the "nighttime" factor, the California Supreme 
Court has stated that it is of "minimal importance" at most and 
"should be appraised with caution." People v. Bower, 597 P.2d 115, 
119, 156 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1979) (citations omitted). That court has 
also recognized that: 
[I]n our society it is not a crime for a citizen 
to be out after dark [and] to permit an officer 
to justify a search on the ground the he 'didn't 
feel1 that a person on the street at night had 
any lawful business there would expose anyone to 
having his person searched by any suspicious 
officer no matter how unfounded the suspicions 
were. Innocent people, going to or from evening 
jobs of entertainment, or walking for exercise or 
enjoyment would suffer along with the occasional 
criminal who would be turned in.' 
People v. Superior Court of Yolo County, 478 P.2d 449, 461, 91 Cal. 
Rptr. 729 (1970). 
There are many lawful and legitimate reasons for citizens 
to be about at night. For example, the Defendant in the case at bar 
testified that he was in the area of arrest in the early hours of 
the morning because of his employment schedule with the Newspaper 
Agency Corp. (T-32). In this case, at least, the "nighttime" factor 
should be considered of no value in determining whether the 
officer's suspicion was reasonable. 
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Factor IV, The officer in this case also testified that he 
became suspicious of criminal activity because he thought the area 
in which he observed the defendant was a "high crime area." 
Addressing this factor, the Supreme Court of California has 
recognized that the "spectrum of legitimate human behavior occurs 
every day in so called high crime areas. As a result, this Court 
has appraised this factor with caution and has been reluctant to 
conclude that a location's crime rate transforms otherwise 
innocent-appearing circumstances into circumstances justifying the 
seizure of an individual." People v. Bower, 156 Cal. Rptr. 856, 597 
P.2d 115, 119 (1979). Thus, the California Court is careful to 
apply close scrutiny to the "high crime area" factor. Such an 
approach makes sense. The factor is not an "activity" of an 
individual or the basis on which a detention should be justified, 
but rather a social phenomena presumably unrelated to any particular 
suspect. 
The Utah Supreme Court has had little opportunity to fully 
analyze the "high crime area" factor. In Carpena, it was cited as 
one factor upon which the officer based his suspicion. Although the 
per curiam opinion does not address the issue specifically, it must 
be inferred that the high crime area factor was insufficient to 
justify the challenged stop. The Utah Court also saw this factor 
arise in the case of State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (1980). In 
that case, the officer observed the defendants alone in an all-night 
laundromat located in a high crime area at 1:00 a.m. The officer 
recognized the defendants from a recent previous criminal encounter 
where he discovered, among other things, a bag of coins in their 
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possession. The Court held that the officer's suspicion of criminal 
activity was reasonable and, therefore, the initial stop that led to 
arrest was justified. 
The circumstances surrounding the stop in Whittenback are 
factually distinct from those in the case at bar. The officer in 
Whitenback had previously apprehended the same defendants in 
possession of a bag of coins. That fact, when coupled with a rash 
of burglaries in the area of the laundromat, could lead to a 
reasonable suspicion that the defendants were committing a crime. 
No such previous contacted existed in the case at bar. The officer 
testified that he did not recall seeing Trujillo or his companions 
prior to the night in question (T-22). Therefore, no link can be 
forged between prior activities of the defendant and his presence in 
a high crime area. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the officer's 
designated high crime area (400 South State Street is within a one 
block radius of many government centers: City and County Bldg., 
Federal Court, District Court, Circuit Court). Also of interest is 
the fact that the officer did not recall any reports of crime 
occurring at that location during his shift (T-24). 
The case law counsels extreme caution in relying on the 
bare assertion that an area is frought with high crime, in 
justifying a stop and detention. Without more, the general social 
phenomenon of a high crime area does not constitute a specific 
articulable fact which creates a reasonable suspicion of criminality. 
Factor V. The officer's subjective interpretation of a 
certain movement by the defendant was cited as an important factor 
leading to the decision to detain. The alleged "furtive" or 
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suspicious movement was nothing more than the defendant shifting the 
position of his knapsack from his side to a position in front of him. 
The officer's inconsistent testimony concerning the 
movement itself illustrates the uncertainty and subjectivity of the 
observation. The officer first testified the movement was "casual" 
or slow. (T-24). Later he described the action as "hasty" or quick 
(T-22). When confronted with this inconsistency the officer 
testified that the movement was in between casual and quick. The 
officer testified that he subjectively believed the movement was 
intended to conceal the bag. However, the officer could not testify 
that the bag was hidden from his view. (T-21). The ordinary nature 
of the movement coupled with the vagueness of, and inconsistencies 
within, the officer's testimony raise crictical issues regarding the 
reliability of the use of this factor in support of the 
establishment of a reasonable suspicion. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not addressed the issue 
of furtive movements, the question has been the focus of significant 
decisions by the Supreme Court of California. In People v. Bower, 
the California Court recognized the inherent problems in attempting 
to infer criminal intent from a furtive movement when it stated that: 
The difficulty is that from the view point of the 
observer, an innocent gesture can often be 
mistaken for a guilty movement. He must not only 
perceive the gesture accurately, he must also 
interpret it in accordance with the actor's true 
intent. But if words are not infrequently 
ambiguous, gestures are even more so. Many are 
wholly nonspecific, and can be assigned a meaning 
only in their context. Yet the observer may view 
that context quite otherwise from the actor: not 
only is his vantage point different, he may even 
have approached the scene with a preconceived 
notion-consciously or subconsciously-of what 
gestures he expected to see and what he expected 
them to mean. The potential for misunderstanding 
in such a situation is obvious. 
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597 P.2d 115, 120-121 (Ca. 1979) (guotineg People v. Superior Court 
of Yolo County, 478 P.2d 449, 455 (Ca. 1970) (emphasis in original)). 
The California high court correctly recognized that the 
reasons for movements interpreted by an officer as furtive may run 
the spectrum from wholly legitimate to completely criminal. Because 
of the great possibility of misinterpretation, courts, as well as 
peace officers, must necessarily be exceedingly cautious when basing 
suspicion on gestures of citizens. 
The case at bar presents a situation wherein the 
possibility for misinterpretation by the officer was extremely 
great. There is nothing objectively suspicious about a "casual" 
shift of a bag from one position to another on one's arm. Such 
movements are the result of wholly legitimate purposes countless 
times every day. For a gesture to be considered an indication of 
criminal intent, it must be unambiguously suspicious. Otherwise, 
ordinary gestures observed in daily life, such as the gesture 
involved in the case at bar, would justify police detainment and 
questioning of law-abiding citizens. Such a result would be a 
negative affront to the liberated society within which we live. 
Factor VI. Additionally, the officer testified that his 
suspicion was aroused because he believed the defendant acted 
nervously upon realizing that he was being observed. This alleged 
nervousness should not be miscontrued to include any reaction which 
occured after Mr. Trujillo's detention. 
Nervous reaction is merely another forum of furtive 
movement and is subject to the same interperative difficulties 
discussed above. Indeed, a "nervous reaction" is even more 
- 13 -
undefinable and more subject to misinterpretation than is a more 
objectively veritable action such as bodily movements. The facts of 
the present case illustrate that point. The officer was unable to 
point to specific and articulable facts that supported his 
conclusion that the defendant acted nervously prior to the resulting 
detention. The following exchange occurred during cross-examination 
of the officer concerning the reason for stopping Mr. Trujillo and 
his companions: 
Q. What was your reason for approaching them? 
A. Their conduct, the time. 
Q. When you say conduct, explain. 
A. Suspicious conduct. 
Q. Suspicious in what way? 
A. As I looked back at them they appeared nervous. 
They appeared shaken that I was there. 
(T. 23-24) The nervousness that the officer allegedly perceived but 
could not articulate in objective terms, is auguably the reaction of 
the majority of persons who come into contact with police. Such 
vague, subjective, instinctual hunches cannot form the foundation of 
a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. 
Assuming arguendo that the gestures and reactions of the 
defendant were objectively suspicious, the officer failed to address 
the issue properly prior to detainment and general questioning. The 
California Supreme Court, in Gallick v. Superior Court of Santa 
Clara County, has indicated that the reasonable course of action for 
an officer to pursue upon interpreting a movement to be suspicious 
is to question the citizen about the gesture itself. 489 P.2d 573, 
576 (1971). Although the citizen would not be obligated to respond, 
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the officer may receive a perfectly legitimate explanation of the 
gesture and have his suspicion allayed. I_d. 576-77. Such a course 
of action would clearly be preferable to that pursued in the case at 
bar where the officer's preconceived notion of the intent behind the 
defendant's demeanor became an important factor leading to an 
unreasonable search and seizure. 
The six factors discussed above, when viewed singly, in the 
context of the circumstances surrounding the case at bar do not 
constitute specific articulable facts which create a reasonable 
suspicion that a crime was being or had been committed by Mr. 
Trujillo. Furthermore, nothing concerning the combination or 
accumulation of those factors renders them more persuasive or 
pertinent in support of a conclusion that the officer's suspicion 
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. "The underlying facts 
fail to reasonably distinguish [the suspected individual] from any 
other citizen" at the time and place of the detention. People v. 
Bower, 597 P.2d 115, 118 (Ca. 1979) (citation ommitted). 
A citizen, presumably having lawful motives, is not 
inherently suspicious when walking along a public sidewalk looking 
in store front windows in the early hours of the morning. Mere 
subjective hunches afford no constitutionally permissible grounds 
upon which to predicate a finding of reasonable suspicion and 
because the defendant in no objectively articulable way appeared 
suspicious, the State has failed to satisfy its burden of justifying 
the detention and the evidence seized pursuant thereto should, 
therefore, have been suppressed. 
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POINT II. 
THE FRISK OF DEFENDANT'S PERSON WAS AN 
UNREASONABLE SEARCH, EVIDENCE SEIZED THEREIN SHOULD 
THEREFORE BE SUPPRESSED. 
[The makers of our constitution] conferred, as 
against the government the right to be left 
alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the 
right most valued by civilized men. To protect 
that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the 
government upon the privacy of the individual, 
whatever the means employed, must be deemed a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Olmstead v. 
The United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478; 48 S.Ct. 
564, 572; 72 L.Ed. 944, 956 (1928). 
The right to be let alone is, of course, not inviolate. 
The Fourth Amendment protects against unwarranted intrusions into 
the privacy of an individual with a very few specifically 
established and jealously drawn exceptions. The facts of the case 
at bar bring into issue the Terry frisk exception. Under Terry v. 
Ohio, supra, police officers were given a "narrowly drawn authority 
to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the 
police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing 
with an armed and dangerous individual regardless of whether he has 
probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.11 rd. at 27. 
Even though a Terry frisk is not dependent on the existence of 
probable cause necessary for an arrest, the initial detention of the 
individual to be searched must be justified by specific articulable 
facts creating a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or is 
being committed. (See discussion in Point 1). 
In Terry v. Ohio the Court attempted to reach a balance 
between the governmental interest of investigating crime including 
the neutralization of danger to the policeman in the investigative 
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circumstance and the individual's right to be free from unreasonable 
searches or seizures. The Court attempted to achieve this balance 
by limiting the type of search which could be performed. In that 
case the Court allowed the frisk of the defendant where the frisk or 
pat down consisted of patting down the outer clothing without 
placing hands in pockets or under the outer surface of clothing 
until a weapon was felt. While authorizing such a search the Court 
stated "even a limited search of the outer clothing for weapons 
constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon the cherished 
personal security." Terry at 25. 
In addition to restricting the physical scope of the search 
the Court in Terry also restricted the purpose of the search. "The 
sole justification of the search in the present situation is the 
protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it must 
therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed 
to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the 
assault of the police officer." Terry at 29. The Terry Court 
specifically recognized that a frisk or pat down could not be used 
to preserve evidence which was in danger of being destroyed. 
In Terry, the Court adopted the "reasonable belief" 
standard. This standard, which has been codified in Utah Law at §-
77-7-16 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), has been explained in this 
way: 
The officer need not be absolutely certain that 
the individual is armed; the issue is whether a 
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would 
be warranted in the belief that his safety or 
that of others was in danger. Further, it is not 
essential that an officer actually have been in 
fear. United States v. Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098, 
1101 (5th Cir. 1976). 
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The officer must, however, have some reasonable basis for stopping 
and frisking. "Due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch1, but to the specific 
reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in 
light of his experience." Terry at 31. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 
(Utah 1985) has construed this standard to mean that the officer 
must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken 
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably 
warrant the intrusion. Jj3. at 659. In State v. Roybal, (716 P.2d 
291 (1986)), the Utah Court adopted the position taken by the United 
States Supreme Court in Terry stating that reasonable inferences 
drawn from those articulable facts derive from the experience of the 
police officer. 
The test enunciated in Terry concerning the validity of a 
Terry frisk cannot be rigidly applied nor is it susceptible to 
mathematical or quantifiable exactitude. "No single factor is 
determitive of reasonableness, a trial judge must determine 
reasonableness in light of all the facts." State v. Houser, Utah, 
669 P.2d 437, 439 (1983) and State v. Carter, supra at 659. It 
remains only to analyze the specific facts of the present case. 
Although each case must be analyzed in light of its own particular 
combination of facts and circumstances, it is helpful to examine 
other Utah cases where the reasonable belief standard has been 
applied. The Utah Court in State v. Carter, supra and in State v. 
Roybal supra determined that the specific and articulable facts and 
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the reasonable inferences drawn thereon in light of the arresting 
officer's experience reached the threshold level and vindicated the 
Terry frisks which were performed in each of those cases. 
In State v. Carter, Officer Winkler of the Salt Lake City 
Police Department stopped and frisked Tommy Lynn Carter. Officer 
Winkler's reliance on the six specific factors, enumerated by the 
Court, justified his reasonable suspicion that Carter may have been 
armed and dangerous. 
1. The individual stopped by Officer Winkler matched a 
radioed dispatch description of a burglary suspect as a black male 
with a blue backpack. 
2. The Court in Carter adopted the position that it is 
reasonable for an officer to infer that a burglary suspect may be 
armed with weapons or tools which could be used as weapons. 
3. Officer Winkler had located the defendant less than a 
block away from the burglary scene approximately one-half hour after 
the radioed dispatch. 
4. The defendant had a large bulge in his front pocket. 
5. Winkler had previously arrested a female who implicated 
an individual with greasy hair and crooked front teeth named Tommy 
Carter in criminal activity. The individual stopped by Officer 
Winkler matched the description and identified himself as Tommy 
Carter. 
6. The officer and the suspect were in a dark alley. 
In constrast to the Carter case, Officer Beesley in the 
case at bar, had not received a radioed dispatch describing either 
Trujillo or his companions. Additionally, Officer Beesley could not 
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recall any reports of criminal activity in the general location 
where he located Trujillo during his entire shift. Officer Beesley 
also testified that he saw no bulges in Trujillo's clothing nor had 
he seen any portion of the knife which was found. Interestingly, 
Beesley could not recall having contact with Trujillo prior to his 
stop. Officer Beesley effectuated his stop in a well-lighted area. 
Also, Officer Beesley had no reason to believe that Trujillo was a 
burglary suspect. Therefore, none of the factors relied on by the 
Court exist in the case at bar. In fact, the facts and 
circumstances in the case at bar are nearly opposite from those in 
the Carter case. 
In State v. Roybal, Deputy Mitchell proceeded to an address 
in response to a complaint phoned in by an individual named Orlando 
Roybal. 716 P.2d at 292. Roybal represented that he was calling 
from a phone booth two blocks away from the address. After 
responding to the address Officer Mitchell encountered and frisked 
Orlando Roybal. In determining that Officer Mitchell had an 
articulable basis for his reasonable belief that Orlando Roybal was 
armed and dangerous, the Court relied on seven specific factors: 
1. There was no one at the phone booth where the call 
reportedly originated. 
2. There was no suspicious vehicle in the vicinity as the 
complaint had indicated. 
3. There had been a shooting incident at that address 
earlier in the morning. 
4. Orlando Roybal had been arrested in conjunction with 
the earlier shooting incident and was reported to still be in 
custody. 
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5. The gun used in the previous incident had not been 
recovered when the defendant was arrested. 
6. Orlando Roybal approached the officer and identified 
himself by name. 
7. The defendant leaned on the car as if he was trying to 
conceal something behind his back. 716 P.2d at 293. 
Without belaboring the point, it is clear that the facts in 
the case at bar are inapposite to those contained in Roybal. Again, 
in the present case, no prior incident or contact with Mr. Trujillo 
had occured prior to the encounter with Officer Beesley at 3:30 a.m. 
on February 28, 1986 and Trujillo was completely unknown to Officer 
Beesley. 
The Roybal and Carter cases differ drastically from the 
case at bar, not only in their factual circumstances, but also in 
the nature of those facts. Whereas in Roybal and Carter specific 
articulable facts existed which justified the officers1 reasonable 
belief that the individuals were armed; in the present case, Officer 
Beesley attempted to justify the frisk performed on Mr. Trujillo 
solely on the basis of the nervousness which he observed. 
Nervousness in and of itself does not constitute an objective 
articulable basis on which the officer could have made the decision 
to frisk Mr. Trujillo. Rather, nervousness falls into the category 
of a mere unparticularized suspicion or hunch which is not 
sufficient. Terry and State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718, 719 (1985). 
In fact, Officer Beesley freely admitted that his feeling or belief 
that Trujillo had a weapon was intuition. (T-30). The intuition 
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relied on by Officer Beesley is a concrete example of the hunch or 
unfounded suspicion which the United States Supreme Court prohibited 
in Terry as did the Utah Supreme Court in Swanigan and Carpena. 
Officer Beesley stated that because of Trujillo's 
nervousness he didn't know whether someone had a gun in their coat, 
and feared that if he turned his back he might be shot. (T-12). 
The unfounded suspicion which he makes reference to is conceivably 
present in every contact Officer Beesley has with members of the 
general public. The suspicion however does not justify frisking 
every individual and thereby invading individual privacy. It is 
therefore clear that the facts relied on by Officer Beesley are of a 
different nature than those relied upon by other officers in 
previous cases. These "facts" did not justify the invasion of Mr. 
Trujillo's person and privacy nor can Officer Beesley rely on his 
experience as a police officer in extrapolating inferences from the 
nervousness he observed. No where in the record did Officer Beesley 
state his years of experience as police officer. The only statement 
he made is that he had worked in downtown Salt Lake for a couple of 
years as a police officer. (T-7). In contrast, the officer making 
the stop and frisk in Terry v. Ohio relied on over 35 years of 
experience to justify the reasonable inferences he drew. 
The State has not met its burden of showing that objective 
and specific articulable facts existed to justify Officer Beesley's 
Terry frisk of Joe Trujillo. Nothing concerning the facts 
surrounding the incident that occured on February 28, 1986, nor the 
past experience of Officer Beesley changed the character of Officer 
Beesley's reliance. Officer Beesley's personal admission that he 
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relied on the impermissible basis of intuition or hunch is clear 
evidence of the unreasonable nature of the search performed. The 
State failed to adduce any specific or objective articulable facts 
which would support a reasonable belief that Mr. Trujillo had a 
weapon in his possession. Therefore, pursuant to constitutional law 
as stated in Terry v. Ohio and Utah statutory law, the search 
performed was an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment. Based on those facts, defendant requests that evidence 
seized as a result of the illegal search be suppressed and that his 
conviction be overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, the Appellant, 
Joseph Trujillo, asks this Court to reverse his convictions and 
remand his case to the lower court for either dismissal of the 
charges, or a new trial. 
ill1*-
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Attorney for Appellant 
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KENDALL S. PETERSON (Bar No. 4389) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
333 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 _
 u _. u., , _, t, _. . „ „ 
c
 ' ^~— H. Dixon h^ intfla^ , Clerk 3rd Dist. Court 
/ CVsoutv Clark 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
ODD _ 0 IQRo 
H. Dixon Hundley, i 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH GREG TRUJILLO, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Case No. CR-86-424 
Comes now the Defendant, Joseph Greg Trujillo, by and 
through his counsel of record, Kendall S. Peterson, and hereby 
moves that the Court suppress all evidence obtained on or about 
February 28, 1986 when Mr. Trujillo was arrested by Officers' 
Beesley and McDonald of the Salt Lake Citv Police Department. 
Defendant bases this motion on the illegality of the Officer's 
stop and detention of the defendant as well as the frisk-search 
performed. Defendant alleges that the Officer's actions were in 
violation of Article I §14 of the Utah Constitution, the Fourth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Laws of the State of Utah 
as contained in §77-7-15 and §77-7-16 Utah Code Annotated. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^Z^ day of ApAt^t 
1986. 
1&&u^Mt—S 
KENDALL S. "PETERSON 
A t t o r n e y f o r Defendan t 
\j 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
Please take notice that the above entitled matter will be 
he ard before the Honorable Judge Rigtrun at his courtroom on 
the 16th day of April, 1986, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. vlease 
govern yourselves accordingly. 
DATED this day of , 1986 . 
7Mr»AT T C Tjt?T'T7DcnM' KENDALL S. ^ETERSON7
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the 
County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah this 
day of , 1986. 
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APR 91986 
T. J. WENNERQREN 
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